Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2019

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Steven Williams, Defendant/
Appellant : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; hosted by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Ronald Fujino, Law Office of Ronald Fujino; counsel for appellant.
Kris C. Leonard, Sean D. Reyes, Utah Attorney General's Office; Joshua N. Graves, Salt Lake
County District Attorney's Office; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Williams, No. 20170277 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2019).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3746

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20170277-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

STEVEN WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from convictions for aggravated assault resulting in
serious bodily injury, a second-degree felony; four counts of
domestic violence in the presence of a child, all third-degree
felonies; and interference with an arresting officer, a class B
misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Richard D. McKelvie presiding

RONALD FUJINO
Law Office of Ronald Fujino
195 East Gentile Street, #11
Layton, Utah 84041
counsel356@msn.com
Counsel for Appellant

KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Solicitor General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Email: kleonard@agutah.gov
JOSHUA N. GRAVES
Salt Lake County Dist. Attorney's
Office
Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... IV
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .............................................................................. 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 7
A. Summary of relevant facts. ........................................................................ 7
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. ...................... 16
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 19
ARGUMENT........................................................................................................... 25
I.

Williams has not proven that no competent attorney could decide
not to object to testimony from Victim’s facial surgeon; neither has
he shown prejudice. ........................................................................................ 25
A. Reasonable counsel could conclude not to file a rule 702
motion......................................................................................................... 28
B. Williams cannot show that no curriculum vitae was provided,
that all competent counsel would have sought one, or that an
objection could have resulted in exclusion of the testimony. ............ 33
C. Reasonable counsel could conclude that the surgeon did not
testify about the ultimate issue of assault, requiring no
objection. .................................................................................................... 34
D. Williams has not proved prejudice......................................................... 38

II. The claimed instructional errors did not constitute deficient
performance, and none were reasonably likely to have affected
the trial’s outcome. .......................................................................................... 40
A. The misdemeanor assault instruction proffered by defense
counsel allowed the jury to consider the lesser offense, and
any error did not affect the trial’s outcome. ......................................... 42

-i-

B. Williams’s failure to make a prejudice argument defeats his
challenge to the self-defense instruction; regardless, any error
in the instruction is necessarily harmless. ............................................ 46
C. Omitting lack of self-defense as an element of the domestic
violence in the presence of a child charges was neither
deficient nor prejudicial because the instructions as a whole
correctly instructed the jury on self-defense. ....................................... 49
III. Williams has not proven that no competent attorney could decide
not to object to testimony from either the investigating officer or
Williams’s daughter. ...................................................................................... 52
A. Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel could
have concluded that the officer’s testimony was offered for
purposes other than showing that the statements were true;
any potential impact was miniscule. ..................................................... 53
B. Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel could
have concluded not to object to his daughter’s testimony................. 57
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 62
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 64

-ii-

ADDENDA
Addendum A: Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
• Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13 (LexisNexis 2018) (expert testimony)
• Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 (LexisNexis 2018) (assault)
• Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402 (LexisNexis 2016) (self-defense)
Addendum B: R767-81 (physician’s testimony)
Addendum C: R343 (Jury Instr. 25)
R347-51 (Jury Instr. 28-32)
R353-57 (Jury Instr. 34-38)
R358 (Jury Instr. 38a)
Addendum D: R834-36 (Officer Haskell’s testimony)

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) ............................................................. 27
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) ....................................................... 39
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) ............................................................... 26, 53
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................. passim
STATE CASES
Arnold v. Grigsby, 2018 UT 14, 417 P.3d 606 ................................................. 55, 59
Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, 17 P.3d 1122 ............................ 48
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993) ....................................................... 41
Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987) ........................... 55, 58, 59
Lemmon v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co, 341 P.2d 215 (Utah 1959) ............... 35, 36, 37
Salt Lake City v. San Juan, 2015 UT App 157, 353 P.3d 623 ............................... 39
State in re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1998) .................................................. 55
State v. Cantarero, 2018 UT App 204 .................................................................... 38
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998) ............................................................. 27
State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231 (Utah 1987) ............................................................ 55
State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, 424 P.3d 171 ............................................................ 44
State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, 285 P.3d 1183 .................................................... 41
State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, 354 P.3d 791 .................................................... 62
State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, 318 P.3d 1164 .................................................. passim
State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 299 P.3d 892 .......................................................... 41
State v. McHugh, 2011 UT App 62, 250 P.3d 1006........................................ 41, 48

-iv-

State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, 302 P.3d 844................................................. 55
State v. Ojeda, 2015 UT App 124, 350 P.3d 640 ............................................. 50, 52
State v. Painter, 2014 UT App 272, 339 P.3d 107 ........................................... 41, 52
State v. Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, 427 P.3d 246,
cert. denied, 429 P.2d 462................................................................................. passim
State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, 147 P.3d 1176 .................................... 28, 29, 32
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986)...................................................... 38
State v. Smith, 2012 UT App 338, 291 P.3d 869 ............................................. 48, 50
State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981) ................................................................ 42
State v. Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204, 407 P.3d 1045 ........................ 43, 45, 46, 47
STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (LexisNexis 2016) ............................................. iii, 47
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (LexisNexis 2018) ....................................... iii, 43, 44
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (LexisNexis 2018) ....................................... iii, 25, 34
STATE RULES
Utah R. Evid. 702 ............................................................................................. passim
Utah R. Evid. 613 .................................................................................................... 61
Utah R. Evid. 803 .............................................................................................. 35, 38

-v-

Case No. 20170277-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

STEVEN WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Steven Williams and Victim lived together for two years, separated in
2015, then reconnected and started dating. After one date in 2016, Williams
and his children joined Victim’s family at her house to spend the night.
Sometime during the following hours, Victim discovered that Williams was
cheating on her and, after she confronted him, Williams got angry when his
phone ended up in the fish tank. Matters escalated, until Williams struck
Victim, knocking her to the ground. He then repeatedly hit her in the jaw
with his fist, fracturing both sides of her jaw, shattering a small piece of bone
beyond repair, breaking teeth, and severing a facial nerve. And he did it in
front of four children ranging in age from 8 to 15.

Williams appealed his convictions for aggravated assault resulting in
serious bodily injury and four counts of domestic violence in the presence of
a child, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. First, he faults his
counsel for not raising various objections to testimony from Victim’s treating
physician. He claims that counsel should have insisted on the State
establishing on the record that the physician was qualified under rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence, to testify as an expert. But he does not show that no
reasonable counsel would have foregone an objection where reasonable
counsel could have concluded without a motion that the witness met the
requirements, that requiring further rule 702 foundation would add to the
witness’ credibility and persuasiveness, and that his testimony was
potentially useful to the defense.
Williams faults counsel for not objecting when the State did not
produce the physician’s curriculum vitae before trial. But he does not show
that it was not produced, and reasonable counsel could have chosen to
proceed without it. Moreover, an objection would only garner a continuance,
and he does not show that it is reasonably likely to have resulted in a more
favorable outcome.
Williams argues that counsel should have objected that the physician
improperly testified about the ultimate issue—whether Williams assaulted
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Victim. But reasonable counsel could have decided not to object because the
physician did not purport to offer expert testimony that Victim was
assaulted. Rather, he simply repeated the Victim’s report, made in the course
of her diagnosis and treatment, that she was assaulted.
Finally, Williams argues that he was prejudiced because, he says,
absent the physician’s testimony, the evidence was insufficient to convict
him. But he does not establish that any or all of the doctor’s testimony would
have been excluded had counsel objected. And he has not proved that any of
the objections would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to make
a more favorable outcome reasonably likely.
Second, Williams claims that his counsel should have objected to
certain jury instructions. But he has not proved that counsel was ineffective
for not doing so. The lesser-included-offense instruction for assault suffered
no defect, and its wording did not prevent consideration or conviction of a
class A misdemeanor. Further, this Court cannot presume prejudice, and
submission of a class B misdemeanor assault instruction is not reasonably
likely to have resulted in a more favorable outcome given the jury’s
determination that Victim suffered serious bodily injury.
Williams also claims that a defect in the self-defense instruction
allowed it to apply to the greater offenses but not to the lesser offenses. His
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failure to argue prejudice defeats his claim. In any event, he could not
establish any reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome with a
different self-defense instruction because he does not contest the jury’s
rejection of his self-defense claim on the greater offenses which rest on the
same facts that applied to the lesser offenses, making a different outcome
unlikely.
And Williams argues that counsel should have asked for a self-defense
element in the instructions for both the greater and lesser-included offenses
of domestic violence in the presence of a child. He does not argue prejudice,
defeating his claim. Further, the jury’s rejection of self-defense for one charge
(aggravated assault) renders his claimed error harmless for the other charges.
Further, the instruction for aggravated assault and assault both included the
self-defense requirement and, between them, formed the predicate domestic
violence offense necessary for all of the charges of domestic violence in the
presence of a child. Thus, the jury necessarily considered self-defense in
addressing the predicate offenses, and the instructions, as a whole, properly
informed the jury as to self-defense.
Third, Williams argues that his counsel should have made a hearsay
objection to an investigating officer’s testimony about information gathered
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at the crime scene. But reasonable counsel could have concluded that the
testimony was not hearsay but was offered to explain the officer’s conduct.
Finally, Williams argues that his counsel should have objected to or
moved to strike as improper character evidence his daughter’s description of
him as manipulative. The witness said her written statement was inconsistent
with her trial testimony because of Williams’s manipulation. But reasonable
counsel could conclude that it was more beneficial to the defense to get the
helpful statement in and to shift to Ex-Wife the “manipulative” label.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Victim’s treating physician testified for the State at trial. Williams’s
counsel sought the usual pre-trial discovery about the witness, including his
curriculum vitae and reports, did not challenge the witness’ qualifications to
testify, and used the witness to try to support defense theories.
1. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective where:
A. they did not insist that the State lay foundation for expert testimony
under rule 702;
B. they did not object to the testimony on the ground that they
purportedly did not receive his curriculum vitae;
C. they did not object when the physician repeated Victim’s statement
that she was assaulted; and
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D. he has not proved either that (1) the omitted objections were
reasonably likely to have succeeded, or (2) any or all of the objections would
have changed the evidentiary picture enough to make a more favorable
outcome reasonably likely?
2A. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not objecting
to the misdemeanor assault instruction where the instruction properly
defined a class A misdemeanor and was not reasonably likely to have
influenced the trial’s outcome?
2B. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not objecting
to a self-defense instruction for which he argues no prejudice and for which
any error is harmless because all of the charges rest on the same facts and
Williams concedes that the instruction properly applied to his aggravated
assault conviction?
2C. Counsel submitted numerous related jury instructions involving
domestic violence in the presence of a child that omitted reference to the
State’s burden to disprove self-defense. But that factor was included in the
elements instruction for the required predicate offenses of domestic violence.
Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for omitting the selfdefense references in the related instructions?
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3A. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not raising
a hearsay objection to testimony that reasonable counsel could conclude was
offered not for the truth but to explain the witness’ conduct?
3B. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not objecting
to his daughter’s explanation that he “manipulated” what she put in her
written statement where reasonable counsel could conclude that the defense
could benefit more from getting the statement admitted and re-directing the
“manipulative” label?
Standard of Review. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review
and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62,
¶8, 427 P.3d 246 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 429 P.2d 462.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.
The domestic violence—Victim’s point of view
Within two months of meeting on a dating website, Defendant Steven
Williams and Victim decided to live together, with Williams and his two
children moving into the home Victim shared with her daughters and
grandchildren. R533-35,909-10. Two years later, Williams and his children
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moved out after Victim punched Williams for propositioning her eldest
daughter. R535,573-74,611-12,617,910. Weeks later, in October 2015, the two
were again dating and discussing marriage. R535-36,574.
About three months later, Williams took Victim home after going out
to dinner, then retrieved his 12-year-old daughter D.D. so they could spend
the night with Victim’s family.1 R540-43,575-76,643,669,797. Williams and
Victim spent part of the next hour drinking mixed drinks and talking. R54345,578,644,673-74,687-88,692-93,788,799-800. During that time, Williams’s exwife [Ex-Wife] dropped off their 14-year-old son D.S. and his 15-year-old
friend [Friend], who settled in to play a game with D.D. in the living room.
R542-43,576-77,609,616-20,638,644,673,786-88,795. When Victim’s 8-year-old
granddaughter V.G.D. appeared in the kitchen, Williams took her back to her
bedroom, leaving Victim and his phone in the kitchen. R546,816,1081.
A message appeared on Williams’s phone, and Victim opened it to
discover that Williams had been secretly conversing with another woman.
R546,621,579-82. She confronted him when he returned and accused him of
cheating. R546,584-85. He, in turn, got mad that she had read his text and

1

Because some of the minor witnesses have the same initials, the State
refers to them by initials representing their relationship to Williams and
Victim, i.e., D.D. for Defendant’s daughter, D.S. for Defendant’s son, and
V.G.D. for Victim’s granddaughter.
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demanded his phone back. R547,584. Victim refused to surrender it, he tried
to grab it, and she tossed it away from him. R547-48,585-86,820. It accidentally
landed in the fish tank, prompting Williams to grab and twist Victim’s arm
so that she pivoted around, then he shoved her to the floor. R548-50,583,58689. Shocked, she refused his offer to help her up, got up herself, and noticed
that V.G.D. was watching them. R550-52,590,820,825-26. Williams again
returned V.G.D. to her room, and Victim went onto the back deck to try to
contact the girl whose number she had taken from Williams’s phone. R55253,547,582-83.
Victim found the door locked when she tried to return to the kitchen,
and D.S. had to let her in. R552-53. She walked past Williams on her way
through the room and felt something hit her hard in the back of the head,
causing her to stumble forward. R553-55. She turned and accused him of
hitting her. R554. He responded by taunting her, repeatedly urging her to hit
him. Id. She refused, calling him a “cheater[,]” at which point Williams “just
popped” her in the jaw with his closed right fist. R555-56,820. She hit the
ground and blacked out briefly. R557,593,677. When she came to, Williams
was on top of her, and she saw D.S. over Williams’s shoulder with his arms
around Williams as he tried to pull Williams off her. R557,594. Williams
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threw D.S. backwards and continued to hit Victim before stopping to demand
that the children get their things so they could leave. R557-58,654,792-93.
The domestic violence—minor witnesses’ points of view
While the children played a game in the living room, they heard a loud
slap and raised voices coming from the kitchen, with Victim calling Williams
a cheater. R619-20,646-48,652,698,700-01. All three children ran to the kitchen
as they heard Victim refuse Williams’s help in getting up. R620,674,69798,789,802. They watched the heated argument before Victim went outside
and D.D. returned to the living room. R647-49,674-76,696,705-08. But D.S.
noticed that the door had locked, so he unlocked the door and stayed “so
nothing [else] would happen.” R649,663,675-76,789-90.
D.D. returned to see D.S. let Victim back in and the arguing between
Victim and Williams continue. R649. Williams was mad and started
“aggressing” on Victim, walking up to her, “puffing out his chest[,]” “flaring
out his arms” as he walked, and claiming his innocence. R621-22,64950,653,664. The children watched Williams advanced on Victim, who put her
hand to his chest and pushed him away. R622-23,664-66,674,700,790.
Williams started egging Victim on, advancing as he raised his voice and
taunting her to “Hit me” and “Do that again one more time[.]” R62223,664,680,706-07,719,791,813. D.S. had not seen Victim hit Williams, but
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Williams kept telling her to “Do it again.” R623-24,664,680,791. Williams kept
walking toward Victim who kept trying to push him away, pushing on and
hitting his chest with her open hand. R624,650,680,704-05,805-06. Her hands
slid up toward Williams’s throat, but none of the children saw Victim choke
Williams or saw Williams struggle to breathe. R637,651,665,680-81,813.
When, in response to Williams’s taunting, Victim hit him, the group saw
Williams cock his arm and shoulder back and drive his fist “[f]ull force” into
Victim’s jaw. R624-25,664,710-11,791, 820,825. He hit her again, and she fell.
R625-26,791,821,827.
D.D. started yelling for Williams to stop. R681. V.G.D. had joined the
group and started yelling and crying. R793-94,820-22. Friend struggled to
hold V.G.D. in the hallway but could still see the events in the kitchen. R62627,712-13,793-94. Williams had followed Victim to the ground, knelt over her,
and continued to hit her in the face. R626-28,678,713,791-92,821,827. D.S.
sprang forward, bear-hugging Williams to get him off of Victim, but Williams
threw him off and continued hitting Victim’s face. R627,678-79,714,792-93.
When he stopped, he told the kids to get their things so they could leave.
R628,654,681,715,792-93.
D.S. thought it would be safer to go to a nearby friend’s house, but D.D.
would not leave. R628-29. D.S. and Friend left on foot but got only a block or
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two away when Williams came after them in his truck and ordered them to
get in. R630-32,654,682-83,794-95,807-08. All three kids said that after leaving
Victim’s house, Williams told them that he had acted in self-defense. R63437,659,685,795-96. Both D.S. and D.D. noticed that Williams had “scratches
and blood all over” his right hand. R636,685.
The injuries
Victim’s injuries required specialized medical attention. R767.
Emergency room doctors took x-rays of the injuries which revealed the need
for a subspecialist. R766-69. So, they contacted Dr. David Stoker, an oral and
maxillofacial surgeon, who took over Victim’s care and treatment. Id. As is
his normal practice when developing a treatment plan for new patients
needing immediate help, he asked her how she sustained her injuries. R76768. Victim stated that she had been “assaulted” “with closed fists[.]”
R768,781.
His review of Victim and the x-rays revealed that both sides of her jaw
were fractured, with the primary point of impact on the left rear of her jaw.
R769-71. The jaw was “grossly displaced” and had lacerated the tissue inside
the mouth above the fracture, a small piece of bone had shattered and was
beyond repair, and a facial nerve was irreparably severed. R564-65,568,59799,770-73. He operated the same day, removing broken teeth and wiring
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Victim’s jaw shut during the surgery in order to position the bones. R564,59899,774-75. He described the surgery as “fairly difficult” due to the degree of
displacement on her left side. R776-77. He initially inserted four metal plates
but ultimately operated twice more due to infections and replaced two plates
with a single bar. R598-99,774-78. He explained that the jaw would never be
like it had been, she would always have problems with her bite, and she
would suffer permanent numbness of the left side of her lip, chin, and part of
her gums. R602-05,778. When pressed by defense counsel, he acknowledged
that it may be “possible” that the severed nerve could regenerate itself but
that it was “exquisitely unlikely” that it would do so. R782-83. He also
explained that her continuing problems with certain foods was due to “the
nature of the long-term effect of the injury[.]” R784. A year after the initial
surgery, Victim remained numb, and he put her chances of further recovery
at “essentially none[.]” R784-85.
The arrest
After gathering information at the crime scene, Officer Joshua Haskell
located Williams at his mother’s house about an hour after Williams arrived
home. R867-68. The officer began by asking Williams for his side of what had
happened that night without identifying the event. R838,854. Williams first
claimed that he had been home all night. R838,853-54. The officer then
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arrested him, and he resisted. R637,839-46. It took two officers to effect the
arrest, and Williams verbally abused the officers on the drive to the jail. R84748. Once Mirandized, he denied doing anything and claimed he had been
“struck several times by a woman” and had left to protect himself and his
children. R844,855,864.
The written statements
After Williams’s arrest, D.S. called his mother Ex-Wife, who picked up
all three kids and took them to her house. R637-38,688,796,814,927. Ex-Wife
immediately notified the police that the children were witnesses and was
given the choice of having them draft written statements or endure live
interviews. R857-58. The kids wrote statements that same night. R638-39,68889,716,803,858-59.
D.S. wrote that Victim called Williams a cheater, that she choked and
punched Williams, and that Williams hit her after she hit him. R652-53,63839,664. At trial, he explained that the written statement was “not wrong” but
that he did not include the fact that Williams was “aggressing” on Victim,
taunting her to hit him “again” and invading her space until she hit him.
R621-23,652-54. He explained that by “choke” he meant that Victim pressed
on Williams’s chest and her hands slid up to his throat while he was
“aggressing” on her. R638-39,652-53. But, like the other kids, he never saw
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Williams backed against the wall with Victim’s hands around his neck, nor
did he see Williams struggle to breathe. R637,680-81,719. He excused the
statement’s imprecise wording because he wrote it at 1:30 a.m., he had not
gotten any sleep, and he was “still putting things together” at the time and
organizing what was in his head. R638-39,653,664-65.
D.D. wrote her statement at 3 a.m. R689. It stated that she heard Victim
“flipped” when she saw the phone message and yelled that Williams was a
“cheater” while she slapped and punched him. R702-03;Def. Exh. 4. Williams
used self-defense, blocking Victim’s punch and hitting her in the jaw three
times. R715-16;Def. Exh. 4. At trial, she said that Williams hit Victim first,
followed her when she fell to the floor and continued hitting her in the face.
R676-79,711,713. She explained that she used “self-defense” in her statement
because Williams “manipulated me into writing it.” R689,719. When asked
how, she said only that he “has his own way of manipulating people.” Id.
Friend wrote his statement at 4:30 a.m. while he was “really tired” and
was bothered by having seen something “no kid wants to see.” R812-14. The
statement reflected that Friend saw Victim’s hands on Williams’s throat as
she hit him. R804. He explained at trial that he did not mean that she actually
choked him but that her hands were “kind of on his throat but then most of
it wasn’t” and that they were there for maybe five seconds. R804. She was
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pushing him away, and she slapped him with her open hand. R804-06.
Williams stood his ground, and when she swung again, he explained,
Williams blocked the swing and started hitting her. R805-06. Like the others,
Friend never saw Williams pinned against a wall or appear to be unable to
breathe when Victim’s hands were near his throat. R637,680-81,719,813.
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
Williams went to trial on one count of aggravated assault (domestic
violence), a second-degree felony [Count 1]; four counts of commission of
domestic violence in the presence of a child, all third-degree felonies [Counts
2-5]; driving under the influence (DUI), a class A misdemeanor; and
interference with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor. R240-43. The
jury was also instructed on the lesser-included-offense of assault and the
lesser-included-offenses of commission of domestic violence in the presence
of a child. R347,353-57. The instructions directed the jury that it could
consider the greater offenses of domestic violence in the presence of a child
only if it found Williams had committed felony aggravated assault. R76364,339,348-51,358. Similarly, it could consider the lesser-included-offenses of
domestic violence in the presence of a child only if it found Williams had not
committed the greater offenses. R763-64,347,353-57.
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Williams did not testify at trial but through cross examination and two
defense witnesses maintained that from the very beginning he had claimed
that he acted in self-defense. His questioning focused largely on establishing
that Victim was not simply sad but was angry that night and that, per her
history, her anger led her to physically attack him. R997-99. His mother
testified that when Williams and his kids moved out of Victim’s house the
first time, it was because Victim got angry, attacked Williams, and gave him
a black eye and a bruised cheek. R909-15. When Williams again started seeing
Victim, his mother was against it, worried that Victim would attack him
again. R916-17,920. When Williams returned with the kids this time, he
confirmed her fear. R920,931-33.
The defense also emphasized the children’s written statements, noting
that they corroborated Williams’s version of the events, including his claims
of self-defense, as well as what Williams’s mother said the children told her
the night he was arrested. R925-27,935-36. Counsel attempted to establish that
the children’s contrary trial testimony was the result of the fact that they had
lived with Ex-Wife since the night of Williams’s arrest and she had
manipulated their testimony in order to get custody, although the children
denied as much. R610,642,716-17,810-12,824,908-9. In support, defense
counsel offered a statement D.S. wrote about an unrelated matter in 2015 in
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which D.S. claimed that Ex-Wife had given him bribes and rewards to get
him “to attack” Williams by lying and filing false police reports. R640-41;Def.
Exh. 3. D.S. denied actually making any false reports, and on re-direct,
explained that when he wrote the 2015 letter, he was living with Ex-Wife, and
Williams dictated the letter for D.S. to write so that Williams could get
custody of D.S. and D.D. R639-41,661-62.
Williams also gave police a formal statement after his arrest in this case.
R872-73,933. In it, he claimed that he acted in self-defense after Victim
assaulted him with a phone, punched him, pinned him against a wall, and
strangled him. R873-74,882. He showed an officer redness on his neck by his
left ear, a scratch on his abdomen, and records from a V.A. hospital saying he
had bruising on his larynx, scratch marks on his neck and behind his ear,
tingling and numbness under one eye, and bruising on his head. R874-75; St.
Exh. 22-27. Williams also had abrasions on his knuckles and fingers, mostly
on his right hand, which he attributed to his construction work. R884-85; St.
Exh. 13-15. Both his children disagreed, noting the scratches and blood were
on his right hand after leaving Victim’s house. R636,685.
Following a two-day trial and a short deliberation, a jury rejected the
lesser-included offenses, acquitted Williams of DUI, and convicted him of all
other charges. R377-80;383-85. The judge sentenced him to the statutory
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periods of commitment for each of his six convictions, running the thirddegree felonies and class B misdemeanor concurrent to each other but
consecutive to the second-degree felony. R405-07. Williams timely appealed.
R405-08.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I. Williams claims his counsel were ineffective for not making
various objections regarding Dr. Stoker’s testimony. But he does not prove a
single instance of deficient performance, let alone multiple instances. And he
has not established any prejudice.
First, he faults counsel for not requiring that the State lay foundation
for Dr. Stoker’s testimony under rule 702. While counsel could have done so,
Williams does not show that all reasonable counsel would have done so.
Reasonable counsel could have concluded based on pre-trial discovery that
the doctor’s testimony met the rule’s requirements without a motion. Counsel
may also have determined that additional foundation would have increased
the witness’ credibility and persuasiveness. And counsel may have decided
to use his testimony to support parts of the defense by establishing that (1)
Victim told the doctor that she got “very angry” at Williams that night, (2)
improvement in Victim’s condition was still possible, though unlikely, and
(3) even permanent numbness would not prevent Victim from using her
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mouth for normal activities. Thus, on this record, Williams cannot establish
that his counsel performed deficiently by not requiring a formal rule 702
showing.
Second, Williams claims his counsel should have required the State to
provide the doctor’s curriculum vitae. But he has not proved that it was not
provided or that no reasonable counsel would have proceeded without it.
Neither does he show that the resulting statutory continuance to get it would
have resulted in a more favorable outcome.
Third, Williams claims that his counsel should have objected that Dr.
Stoker opined on the ultimate issue: whether he assaulted Victim. But the
doctor simply reported what Victim told him during treatment. Because he
did not offer a medical opinion that the injuries resulted from an illegal
assault, a competent attorney could decide not to object.
Williams also does not demonstrate prejudice for his claims. He argues
that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s silence because without the doctor’s
testimony there would have been insufficient evidence to prove the bodily
injury element for each charged crime. But he has not proved either (1) a
reasonable likelihood that any or all of the doctor’s testimony would have
been excluded; or (2) that excluding his testimony would have changed the
evidentiary picture enough to make a more favorable outcome reasonably
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likely. Williams does not show that the physician could not have met rule 702
requirements had counsel raised an objection. Even if the State did not turn
over the doctor’s curriculum vitae, which he does not prove, the remedy
would have been a continuance absent proof that the State acted in bad faith.
Williams makes no effort to adduce such proof. And assuming exclusion of
the doctor’s references to assault, Williams does not show how that exclusion
would make a more favorable outcome reasonably likely.
Issue II. Williams faults counsel for not objecting to several jury
instructions. But Williams does not establish any flaw in the instructions or
show that they had any effect on the outcome of his trial.
He claims that the instruction for the lesser-included-offense of assault
combines the elements for both class A and class B misdemeanors and
misstates an element for the class A misdemeanor. But the instruction merely
requires that the jury first determine that an assault occurred by finding the
requisite “bodily injury” and then requires that the jury determine whether
that bodily injury is “substantial,” thereby elevating the misdemeanor to a
class A. And there can be neither deficient performance nor prejudice from
instructing the jury that it must find that Williams’s fist striking Victim’s face
“resulted in” rather than “caused” her injury.
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Finally, there is no authority for Williams’s claim that prejudice be
presumed under these circumstances. And he does not affirmatively prove
prejudice. The jury was not prevented from considering the class A
misdemeanor. Moreover, the jury evaluated the severity of Victim’s injury
pursuant to a proper, unchallenged definitional instruction and found that
she suffered serious bodily injury, making it unlikely that an instruction on
class B misdemeanor assault would have led to a different evaluation of the
injury and, hence, a more favorable outcome.
Williams also claims that the language of the self-defense instruction,
while appropriate to his five felony convictions, omitted language that would
allow it to be applied to the five lesser-included-offenses of assault and
domestic violence in the presence of a child. But he cannot establish any
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome with a different selfdefense instruction because the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim on
the greater offenses involved the same facts at issue regarding the lesserincluded offenses.
Finally, none of the elements instructions for the greater and lesser
offenses of domestic violence in the presence of a child expressly requires that
the jury consider Williams’s self-defense claim. Williams argues that his
counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the instructions and requiring
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that the self-defense element be added to each. The absence of any prejudice
argument defeats his claim.
In any event, he cannot establish prejudice. First, because the charges
and the self-defense claim were based on the same facts, rejection of selfdefense for one charge makes any omission of self-defense in any other
charge harmless.
Second, the instructions, as a whole, required that the jury properly
address the self-defense issue, defeating Williams’s ineffectiveness claim.
Domestic violence in the presence of a child requires that the jury find
Williams committed a predicate offense of domestic violence. In this case,
that was either aggravated assault or assault, both of which directed that the
jury consider Williams’s self-defense claim. Thus, the instructions properly
directed the jury to consider and reject the self-defense claim in deciding the
predicate offense of domestic violence before considering whether that act
occurred in the presence of a child. Nothing more was required.
Issue III.A. Williams claims that his counsel were ineffective for not
raising a hearsay objection to testimony from Officer Haskell that almost
everyone at the crime scene told him the same thing about how the incident
occurred and how Victim got injured. But reasonable counsel could conclude
that a hearsay objection was not appropriate because the information was not
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offered for the truth. The officer testified that the information came from his
“assisting officers” and that the information and the severity of Victim’s
injuries prompted him to track down Williams.
Regardless, an objection would not have changed the evidentiary
picture enough to make a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. The
report from assisting officers said nothing about the children’s trial testimony
and could not, therefore, vouch for or refine that testimony, as Williams
claims. And the officer’s brief comment is unlikely to have altered the jury’s
perception of the discrepancies between the testimony and written
statements of the four minors which had already been thoroughly examined
and which factored prominently in the parties’ closing arguments.
Issue III.B. Finally, Williams argues that his counsel should have
objected to D.D.’s description of Williams as manipulative. Contrary to her
trial testimony, D.D.’s written statement included the phrase, “He was using
self-defen[s]e.” She explained that Williams manipulated her into writing it.
But counsel’s silence was in keeping with their strategy, which Williams does
not show was unreasonable. Their self-defense theory relied heavily on
persuading the jury of the veracity of the children’s written statements which
corroborated Williams’s self-defense claim. Counsel stressed that Williams
was in jail when D.D. wrote hers and that any manipulation came from Ex-
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Wife’s continuing influence so she could get custody of the children. Counsel
offered additional evidence to reinforce Ex-Wife’s manipulation. Further, the
rules allowed D.D. to explain the discrepancy between her written statement
and her testimony. An objection would risk exclusion of the written
statement. Reasonable counsel could conclude that, on the whole, the defense
was better served by not objecting to D.D.’s testimony.

ARGUMENT
I.
Williams has not proven that no competent attorney
could decide not to object to testimony from Victim’s
facial surgeon; neither has he shown prejudice.
Williams argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did
not object to some or all of Victim’s facial surgeon’s testimony. First, he faults
counsel for not objecting that the State had not met the foundational
requirements for expert testimony under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Aplt.Br. 11-14. Second, he complains that counsel should have objected that
the State did not provide the surgeon’s curriculum vitae prior to trial as
required by section 77-17-13, Utah Code Ann. Id. at 17-20. Third, he argues
that when the surgeon explained that Victim told him she was assaulted,
defense counsel should have objected that the surgeon had opined about the
ultimate issue. Id. at 14-17. Finally, he argues that he was prejudiced because
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without the surgeon’s testimony, the evidence was insufficient to establish
the bodily injury element for each of the charged crimes. Id. at 22-24.
To prevail, Williams must prove two elements: (1) deficient
performance and (2) prejudice. State v. Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, ¶9, 427
P.3d 246 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 429 P.2d 462. To prove deficient
performance, Williams must prove that no reasonable attorney would have
done what his counsel did. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88
(1984). This Court’s review of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential because unlike this Court, counsel “observed the relevant
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.” Id. There are “countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case” and even “the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.” Id. at 689.
These principles distill to this: a defendant claiming deficient
performance must prove that “no competent attorney” would have
proceeded as his counsel did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011).
To prove prejudice, Williams must prove that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A

-26-

reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104
(2011) (cleaned up). Rather, “[c]ounsel’s errors must be so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id.
(cleaned up). Proof of prejudice must be based on a “demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter.” State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)
(cleaned up).
Williams has not proved deficient performance. Because the claim is
one of ineffective assistance, the focus is not on the merits of the potential
challenges to the surgeon’s testimony. Neither is the focus on whether
counsel could have challenged the testimony. Rather, the issue is whether, on
this record, all competent defense attorneys would have challenged the
testimony’s admissibility under 702, the State’s compliance with the statutory
notice provision for expert testimony, or the witness’ reference to Victim’s
use of the term “assault.” The answer is no. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See
also Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, ¶8 (appellate court views the substantive
issue in an ineffective assistance claim through the lens of counsel’s
performance).
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And had counsel raised the indicated objections, Williams does not
show that any of the testimony would have been excluded or if it was, that it
would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to make a more
favorable outcome reasonably likely.
A. Reasonable counsel could conclude not to file a rule 702
motion.
Williams has not proved that all competent counsel would have
insisted on a hearing to determine whether the State could show that the
facial surgeon’s testimony met rule 702’s threshold for admissibility.2
Expert testimony as addressed in rule 702 “is opinion or fact testimony
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” State v.
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶¶11, 34, 147 P.3d 1176. Among other things, expert
testimony will not be admitted unless it is shown that the witness is
“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education” and the principles and methods underlying the testimony meet a
“threshold showing” that they are “reliable,” “based upon sufficient facts or
data,” and “have been reliably applied to the facts.” Utah R. Evid. 702.

2

Williams also contends that Dr. Stoker cannot be viewed as “a fact
witness for what occurred before [Victim’s] arrival at the hospital.” Aplt.Br.
14. But the doctor did not testify as a fact witness for events that occurred
before he met with Victim. See subsection I.C., infra (establishing that the
doctor referenced Victim’s explanation for how the injury occurred when
gathering information for diagnosis and treatment).
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Williams says that his counsel should have objected to the treating
surgeon’s testimony because the State did not lay this foundation before the
surgeon testified. Aplt.Br. 12-14. He argues that his counsel permitted Dr.
Stoker to testify about “matters beyond the realm of his expertise[,]” touching
on radiology and biomechanical analysis without requiring that he show that
the principles or methods underlying those fields were reliable and were
reliably applied to the facts or data in this case. Id. at 13-14. Similarly, he
criticizes counsel for permitting the doctor to testify in the area of his
expertise—dental surgery or facial reconstruction—without a showing that
the principles or methods underlying his expertise were reliable and were
reliably applied to the facts or data in this case. Id.
But the issue is not whether counsel had an available rule 702 objection.
It’s whether, on this record, all competent defense attorneys would have
challenged the testimony’s compliance with rule 702. Williams has not
attempted to meet that burden.
Nor can he establish on this record that all reasonable counsel would
have concluded that the requirements of rule 702(b) were not or could not be
met in this case. Instead, the foundation laid at trial for the doctor’s testimony,
together with defense counsel’s pre-trial request for extra-record information
about the doctor, his testing, and his anticipated testimony, strongly suggest
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that defense counsel had sufficient information to decide to forego a rule
702(b) objection to the surgeon’s testimony.
Specifically, the foundation laid at trial established that the doctor
completed both a doctor/dental surgery degree and a residency in oral and
maxillofacial surgery before 2009, became board certified as a surgeon and
had a community practice at his own local private clinic, and at the time of
trial had also been working a rotation schedule taking calls at multiple
trauma centers around the valley handling general, oral, and maxillofacial
surgery, including traumatic facial injuries stemming from a variety of causes
that included assaults. R766-67. Reasonable counsel could determine from
this foundation that a challenge to the facial surgeon’s qualifications to give
expert opinions in the areas of general, oral and maxillofacial surgery would
have been unlikely to succeed.
Further, the record suggests that defense counsel had access to extrarecord information that would have further informed them about a rule 702
objection. They sought before trial all “reports or results of scientific tests,”
the curriculum vitae and qualifications of all experts, written reports
prepared by any witness, and “any tests or other specialized data” on which
experts relied. R44-47. Counsel never complained that the State did not
comply with the requests, the State provided defense counsel with a cd and
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a hardcopy of Victim’s medical records five months before trial, and defense
counsel referred at trial to Dr. Stoker’s multiple “reports” as well as other
medical reports generated in Victim’s treatment. R129-30,779-81.
Thus, defense counsel had access to a wealth of record and non-record
information about Dr. Stoker, his qualifications, and his specific handling of
this case that would permit counsel to determine to forego a rule 702
objection. In addition, the doctor explained that the goal of his surgery is to
return patients to their normal functioning. R779. Reasonable counsel could
conclude that the doctor’s years of education and expertise would necessarily
permit him to understand sufficient aspects of other scientific areas—like
interpreting radiologic images or understanding the biomechanical workings
of a jaw—to permit him to know what “normal” is, to judge why something
is no longer “normal,” and to create and implement a treatment and surgical
plan to return it to “normal[.]”
Further, the foundation at trial established that the doctor had worked
in a number of different hospitals in this area for a number of years. R766-67.
It may well have been that one or more of Williams’s counsel or his defense
team had prior experience with the doctor in some capacity, further
informing a decision concerning whether to require an express rule 702(b)
showing.
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Moreover, reasonable counsel could well choose not to force the State
to lay further rule 702(b) foundation because parading further detail about
the facial surgeon’s experience and training would only have added to his
persuasiveness.
And counsel may have weighed into a calculus of whether to object to
the surgeon’s testimony his potential usefulness to the defense. The first
observation defense counsel made in both opening and closing, and
repeatedly revisited, was that Victim assaulted Williams. R522-23,997-1011.
And counsel stressed evidence establishing that when Victim got angry at
Williams in the past, she attacked him. Id. Counsel urged the jury to find that
she was an “angry woman” the night of the charged assault, that she
“turn[ed] her anger into a physical assault,” and that Williams had to defend
himself. Id. In contrast to the State’s evidence that Victim was sad but not
angry (R589,622,1005-06), Dr. Stoker’s report established that Victim
professed to have gotten “very angry” at Williams that night. R781.
And like counsel below, reasonable counsel could use the opportunity
to mitigate the more damaging aspects of the surgeon’s testimony. For
example, counsel elicited that Victim suffered no other injuries, that
improvement in Victim’s condition was still possible, that the severed nerve
could possibly but not likely regenerate, and that even if Victim suffered
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permanent numbness, it did not prevent her from using her mouth normally.
R779-85;894;1008-09.
For these reasons, Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel
would have foregone a rule 702 objection. On this record, the presumption of
reasonable representation remains unrebutted, and his claim fails. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89.
B. Williams cannot show that no curriculum vitae was provided,
that all competent counsel would have sought one, or that an
objection could have resulted in exclusion of the testimony.
Williams claims that his counsel were ineffective because they did not
object when they did not receive Dr. Stoker’s curriculum vitae before trial.
Aplt.Br. 17-20. This, he says, prejudicially “allow[ed] the jury to consider” the
doctor’s testimony, he argues. Id. at 19. His claim fails for two reasons.
First, he offers no record support for his bald assertion that the doctor’s
“curriculum vitae was not provided[.]” Id. In fact, the record shows that
counsel likely received it. They clearly knew they were entitled to a copy of
both his curriculum vitae and his written reports because they asked for both
in their written discovery request. R44-47. They received a timely response to
the request, and nothing in the record demonstrates that the response was in
any way deficient. See subsection I.A., supra. This reasonably suggests either
that counsel received the curriculum vitae or, if not, recognized as much but
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decided not to pursue it, perhaps because they chose to use the doctor’s
testimony to further the defense. See id. This defeats Williams’s claim.
Second, Williams has not proved that the surgeon’s testimony would
have been excluded even if the State did not turn over the curriculum vitae.
Exclusion would have been the remedy only if the trial court found the State
deliberately withheld it in “bad faith.” Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(4)
(LexisNexis 2018) (in Add. A). Williams has not alleged bad faith, let alone
proven it on this record. So, counsel could at most have secured a
continuance. Id. And Williams has not argued that a continuance would have
given the defense a strategic advantage so critical that all competent counsel
would have taken steps to secure one.
C. Reasonable counsel could conclude that the surgeon did not
testify about the ultimate issue of assault, requiring no
objection.
Finally, Williams contends that Dr. Stoker opined on the ultimate issue
in this case—whether Williams assaulted Victim—and argues that counsel
should have objected. Aplt.Br. 14-17. But Williams mischaracterizes the
testimony so that an admissible statement Victim made in the course of her
medical treatment appears to be an inadmissible comment on the ultimate
issue.

-34-

Williams takes the relevant references out of context, placing remarks
that occur over the course of 5 pages into a single block quote. Id. at 15-16.
But the testimony he omits establishes that the surgeon was merely reporting
what Victim said to him—she was assaulted—in response to the doctor’s
efforts to obtain information necessary to her diagnosis and treatment. As
such, it was admissible at trial. See Utah R. Evid. 803(4)(A) & (B) (a statement
is admissible as non-hearsay if it “is made for—and is reasonably pertinent
to – medical diagnosis or treatment;” and “describes medical history; past or
present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause”). See
also Lemmon v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co, 341 P.2d 215, 218 (Utah 1959) (treating
physician can testify to the patient’s statements about symptoms and history;
an expert may discuss information relied on in forming an opinion).
Placed back in context, the remarks were explained the first time they
occurred. On direct examination, the prosecutor established that when Dr.
Stoker responded to the call from the hospital, he met with Victim.
Q (prosecutor).
And did you ask her about how she
sustained her injuries?
A. I do. I will generally will [sic] ask the patient how they
sustained the injury. The mechanism of injury is often of some
importance to us to help as we formulate a treatment plan for the
patient to know what injuries we might be looking for.
Q. And based on your interaction with her, what was your
understanding of how she sustained her injury?
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A. That she was assaulted, to my understanding, with
closed fists by an assailant.
Q. And why did knowing that—why was that important
for you in diagnosing her?
A. The mechanism of injury can be important given the
type of fractures and the number of fractures that we will look
for.
R767-68 (in Add. B). Thus, the term “assaulted” came from Victim’s report
given in the course of medical assessment and treatment. Such a use is
entirely appropriate. See Lemmon, 341 P.2d at 218. Moreover, the reference did
not tie the assault to Williams.
Other references to variations of “assault” occurred thereafter (see Add.
B). Dr. Stoker explained that in cases “like an assault[,]” a blow is delivered
“sideways” with enough force that it could break a jaw in two places. R770.
Still later, the prosecutor asked the doctor where the “primary point of
impact” occurred based on what Victim said and what he learned from his
own assessment. R770-71. The doctor believed the point of impact was the
back left part of Victim’s jaw because that’s where the “greater displacement”
is and, as most “assailants” are right handed, the impact will commonly occur
on the patient’s left side. R771. And later, when the prosecutor asked “what
kind of force” it would take to cause the damage Victim suffered, the doctor
responded, “Blunt force trauma like this in an assault. It takes a considerable
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amount of force.” R773. Read in light of the initial explanation, each of these
remarks simply uses a form of “assault” as originally used by Victim: as a
colloquial substitute for “hit.”
Defense counsel understood this use and reinforced it on crossexamination for the jury’s benefit. Counsel produced a copy of Dr. Stoker’s
report that was generated “in the course of [Victim’s] treatment” and asked
him specific questions about its contents. R780-81 (Add. B).
Q (defense counsel). …So do you find the section where—of
your report that—I believe it’s entitled “History of Present
Illness”?
A. Yes, Ma’am. I see it here.
Q. And that’s what you are talking about when you talk
about the information that you received from [Victim] about
how her injury occurred; am I correct about that?
A. Correct. And to a degree there’s oftentimes overlap.
With the admitting physicians, we use their reports as well.
Q. Okay. And one of the things that she indicated is that
she’s not clear if she lost consciousness or not; correct?
A.

Correct. That’s what I noted, yes.

Q. And what’s also indicated in there is that she reportedly
discovered her boyfriend cheating on her; correct?
A. Correct. Yes.
Q.

And subsequently, he assaulted her?

A.

Yes.

Id.
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Thus, viewed in context, the doctor’s use of “assault” to describe the
blow that inflicted Victim’s injuries was not a medical or legal opinion but
simply a recognition of Victim’s use of that term to describe the source of her
injuries so he could conduct an assessment and formulate a treatment plan.
As such, it was admissible under rule 803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence. See State
v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222-24 (Utah 1986)(psychiatrist’s testimony
about patient’s statements of his history “came well within” rule 803(4)). The
terminology was not argued by either party to mean anything else. Thus,
reasonable counsel could conclude that no objection was necessary.
D. Williams has not proved prejudice.
Williams argues that his counsel’s silence in the face of Dr. Stoker’s
testimony was prejudicial because “[a]bsent David Stoker’s testimony, the
evidence was insufficient” to support his convictions because the jury would
be unable to distinguish “between bodily injury, substantial bodily injury,
and serious bodily injury.” Aplt.Br. 22-24.
The proper test, however, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for Williams had his counsel raised the issues he
has identified. See State v. Cantarero, 2018 UT App 204, ¶13; Parkinson, 2018
UT App 62, ¶¶9, 12. To prove that, Williams must prove both (1) a reasonable
probability that an objection would have succeeded, and (2) that the
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successful objection would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to
make a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. See Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Williams has not met this burden.
First, Williams has not proved a reasonable likelihood that Dr. Stoker
could not have been qualified as an expert had defense counsel required onthe-record proof of compliance with rule 702(b). See Salt Lake City v. San Juan,
2015 UT App 157, 353 P.3d 623 (prejudice not established for counsel’s alleged
failure to object to admitting officer’s alleged expert testimony where
defendant did not show a reasonable likelihood that officer would not have
qualified as expert). In fact, the record evidence is to the contrary. See
subsection I.A., supra.
Second, had counsel objected to the doctor’s references to assaultive
behavior, only those references would have been excluded. Not only is that
testimony irrelevant to the prejudice Williams claims, but its absence is not
reasonably likely to have produced a more favorable outcome for Williams
in light of the remainder of the doctor’s testimony that would remain before
the jury.
Finally, as previously stated, had counsel informed the trial court that
it had not been given the doctor’s curriculum vitae, counsel would have
received a continuance to obtain the document. See subsection I.B., supra. He
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does not show that a continuance would have led to information that would
have altered the admissibility of the doctor’s testimony.
Accordingly, Williams has not shown that any objection to Dr. Stoker’s
testimony would have succeeded in excluding any of his testimony. Even if
it had, it is unlikely to have changed the evidentiary picture. Victim testified
about her injuries, the extensive treatment they required, and the lasting
effects as of trial. This evidence, together with the jury instruction detailing
the bodily injury definitions, would have permitted the jury to differentiate
between the types of bodily injury, making a more favorable outcome
unlikely absent the doctor’s testimony. R340. Thus, Williams’s ineffectiveness
claims as to the doctor’s testimony fail. See Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, ¶9
(failure to prove prejudice defeats an ineffective assistance claim).
II.
The claimed instructional errors did not constitute
deficient performance, and none were reasonably
likely to have affected the trial’s outcome.
Williams argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did
not object to several jury instructions. He first faults the lack of an objection
to both an allegedly flawed instruction for the lesser-included-offense of
assault and to a narrow self-defense instruction. Aplt.Br. 24-37. He says that
the result of the former is that the jury was unable to consider the lesserincluded-offense of assault, while the result of the latter was that the jury
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could not apply his self-defense claim to any of the lesser-included-offenses.
Id. at 29-31,33.
He then argues that his counsel should have objected to the elements
instructions for the multiple counts of domestic violence in the presence of a
child. Id. at 37-42. He maintains that the instructions misstate the law because
they do not include a requirement that the jury find he did not act in selfdefense. Id.
Again, Williams must prove both elements of Strickland. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687-88, 697; State v. McHugh, 2011 UT App 62, ¶4, 250 P.3d 1006. Jury
instructions that correctly state the law require no objection. State v. Lee, 2014
UT App 4, ¶22, 318 P.3d 1164. This Court views the instructions “’in their
entirety’” to determine whether they “’fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case.’” State v. Painter, 2014 UT App 272, ¶6, 339 P.3d 107
(quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶148, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up)).
And “even when a jury instruction is erroneous, the error may
nevertheless be harmless[.]” See State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶¶24-28, 285
P.3d 1183. Proof of prejudice “must be a demonstrable reality,” not mere
speculation. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Errors that have
an “isolated” or “trivial effect” on the verdict are not prejudicial. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695-96. Even erroneous affirmative-defense instructions can be
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harmless given the evidence. See State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 91-92 (Utah 1981)
(error in self-defense instruction was harmless under facts); Lee, 2014 UT App
4, ¶¶28-33 (error in imperfect self-defense instruction was harmless under
facts).
Here, Williams’s claims fail because he cannot establish deficient
performance where the instructions as a whole properly instruct the jury, he
urges this Court to presume prejudice where no presumption is available,
and he does not otherwise establish prejudice.
A. The misdemeanor assault instruction proffered by defense
counsel allowed the jury to consider the lesser offense, and any
error did not affect the trial’s outcome.
The trial judge used defense counsel’s proposed jury instruction
detailing the lesser-included-offense of “assault, domestic violence.”
R289,347. That instruction required, in relevant part, proof that Williams
4. Committed an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused
bodily injury to another; and,
4. That resulted in substantial bodily injury to another….
R347 (Jury Instr. 28) (in Add. C).
Williams claims that this instruction suffers from two problems. First,
he asserts that the first of the above elements pertains to class B misdemeanor
assault while the second pertains to class A misdemeanor assault. Aplt.Br. 2428. The extra element, he argues, effectively combines the elements for a class
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A and a class B misdemeanor into a single instruction, robbing him of a
“proper instruction” as to either class of misdemeanor. Id. at 28-29. Second,
he explains, the element for the class A misdemeanor is misstated, using the
term “resulted in” instead of the statutory term “caused.” Id. at 28. The result
of these errors, he claims, was to prevent the jury “as a matter of law” from
convicting him of the lesser-included-offense of assault. Id. at 29.
Williams does not claim that a class A misdemeanor instruction was
inappropriate or that he was entitled to a class B misdemeanor instruction.
See State v. Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204, ¶26, 407 P.3d 1045 (rejecting assertion
that counsel is deficient by not requesting every lesser included offense
available). He argues only that neither was properly defined in the
instruction.
But the instruction permitted the jury to convict Williams of class A
misdemeanor assault. Assault is statutorily defined as “an act, committed
with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.” Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2018) (in Add. A). This is what the first #4 element required:
commission of “an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused bodily
injury to another[.]” R347. If that was all the jury was required to find, it could
convict him of a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102(1)(2). But
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the instruction required that the jury find more. The very next requirement
was that the bodily injury be “substantial.” R347. An assault is a class A
misdemeanor if the bodily injury caused by the assault is “substantial bodily
injury[.]” Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102(3)(a). Thus, a finding by the jury of all of
the listed elements would support a conviction for class A misdemeanor
assault.
Further, use of the phrase “resulted in substantial bodily injury”
instead of the statutory language of “causes substantial bodily injury” is a
difference without a meaning. The charged act was Williams striking Victim’s
face with his fist. Whether his use of his fist “caused” the injury or “resulted
in” the injury is a matter of semantics; Williams could have suffered no
prejudice from the substitution of one term for the other under these facts.
Williams further argues that this Court should presume prejudice from
the misdemeanor instruction because an error in instructing on the “basic
elements” of the lesser-included-offense of assault can never be harmless. Id.
at 35-36. Even if the instruction was erroneous, this argument would fail as it
has been conclusively rejected in Utah. See State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶¶3448, 424 P.3d 171 (rejecting claim that prejudice may be assumed for
ineffectiveness claim based on erroneous instruction on lesser-included
offense which was submitted by defense counsel); Parkinson, 2018 UT App
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62, ¶¶10-11 (“Prejudice is not shown automatically nor is it presumed in jury
instruction errors attributable to counsel’s deficient performance”)(cleaned
up). A defendant’s burden to establish a “reasonable probability that the jury
would have returned a more favorable verdict…if properly instructed” is
well-settled. See, e.g., Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶26-33 (requiring affirmative
showing of prejudice in addition to proof of deficient performance for not
objecting to erroneous instruction).
Thus, Williams must affirmatively prove prejudice and he cannot. He
claims prejudice because the allegedly improper instruction rendered the
lesser-included-offense of assault a “legally unavailable option” which “as a
matter of law” the jury could not consider. Aplt.Br. 29, 35-37. But, as
explained, the jury was not prevented from considering and convicting him
of a class A misdemeanor. See Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204, ¶30 (recognizing
jury could have convicted defendant of lesser offense despite fact the
instruction improperly stated the crime’s elements and “would have been
incapable of supporting a conviction”). Further, had the jury found that the
State had proved nothing more than the elements of class B misdemeanor,
the instruction as written would have required an acquittal, to Williams’s
benefit.
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And Williams cannot show that an instruction for class B misdemeanor
assault is reasonably likely to have resulted in a more favorable outcome. The
jury was properly instructed as to the bodily injury definitions, evaluated
Victim’s injury, and determined that she had suffered serious bodily injury.
R339-40,383. There is no reasonable likelihood that submission of an
instruction on Class B misdemeanor assault would have prompted any
different evaluation of Victim’s injury, making a more favorable outcome
improbable.
Because the instruction, as written, permitted the jury to consider the
lesser-included-offense of class A misdemeanor assault and Williams cannot
show a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome had counsel
objected to the instruction, his claim fails. See Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204,
¶¶29-31, & n.4 (defense counsel’s submission of erroneous lesser-includedoffense elements instruction was not prejudicial where it had no effect on the
trial’s outcome).
B. Williams’s failure to make a prejudice argument defeats his
challenge to the self-defense instruction; regardless, any error
in the instruction is necessarily harmless.
Williams also argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the
self-defense instruction given to the jury. Aplt.Br. 31-33. That instruction
provides, in part, “you are instructed that a person is justified in using force
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likely to cause serious bodily injury only if the person reasonably believes
that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the
person.” R343 (Jury Instr. 25, in Add. C),903. Williams does not fault this
language and concedes that this provision is appropriate for the five felony
charges. Aplt.Br. 32-33. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2016)
(in Add. A).
But he argues that the instruction prejudicially narrows the application
of the affirmative defense by omitting any reference to the language in
subsection (1)(a) of the self-defense statute: “threatening or using force
against another” when he “reasonably believes that force or a threat of force
is necessary to defend the person” against the “imminent use of unlawful
force.” Aplt.Br. 32-33. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1)(a). In other words, he
claims that the instruction, as written, applies to the felony offenses with
which he was charged because they involve “death or serious bodily injury”
but not to any of the lesser-included offenses on which the jury was
instructed. Aplt.Br. 32-33. Williams argues that this prevented the jury from
considering his self-defense claim for the lesser-included offenses and
rendered his counsel’s performance deficient. Id.
Although Williams carries the burden of affirmatively establishing
both elements of his ineffective assistance claim, he has not argued how the
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challenged self-defense instruction prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68788, 697; McHugh, 2011 UT App 62, ¶4 (“defendant must show both deficient
performance and prejudice” to establish an ineffectiveness claim) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). He claims that the jury “could not apply selfdefense” to several charges, but he does not assert that, had counsel objected
and a different instruction been given, there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury would have acquitted him of those charges. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. His claim fails for this reason alone. Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens,
2000 UT 98, ¶7, 17 P.3d 1122 (defendant’s “[f]ailure to provide any analysis
or legal authority” on the issue of prejudice “constitutes inadequate briefing”
that this Court cannot and will not review); State v. Smith, 2012 UT App 338,
¶18, 291 P.3d 869 (refusing to conduct review for ineffective assistance absent
an argument on either requirement).
Williams could not meet his burden in any event. The jury found that
the State had disproved self-defense when it convicted him of aggravated
assault and the remaining greater offenses, and Williams does not contest the
self-defense instruction’s application to those offenses. R339,343,348-51,38385. All of the lesser-included offenses are based on the same facts. Because
the jury rejected self-defense on the greater offenses on the same facts that
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applied to the lesser, omitting language from the instruction for offenses not
involving death or serious bodily injury did not harm Williams.
C. Omitting lack of self-defense as an element of the domestic
violence in the presence of a child charges was neither
deficient nor prejudicial because the instructions as a whole
correctly instructed the jury on self-defense.3
In a related claim, Williams argues that his counsel were ineffective for
not objecting to jury instructions 29-32 (R348-51) and 34 (R353), which
address the elements of the four counts of domestic violence in the presence
of a child as both greater and lesser offenses.4 Aplt.Br. 37-42. He maintains
that because he claimed self-defense at trial, the elements instructions for all
of the charged crimes must expressly tell the jury that before it can convict on
any one of them, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act
in self-defense. Id. at 39-42. And because the elements instructions for
aggravated assault and assault include this directive while the remaining
offenses do not, he argues, the jury received inconsistent messages that
allowed it “to conclude that self-defense did not apply” to the domestic

3

This argument responds to Point III of Williams’s brief. Aplt.Br. 37-

42.
4

Williams appears to intend to include all of the lesser-includedoffense counts involving domestic violence in the presence of a child. Aplt.Br.
40. Those instructions span instructions 34 through 38, but only instruction
34 sets out the elements. R353-57 (in Add. C).
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violence charges. Id. at 40-41. He argues that counsel should have objected to
these instructions so as “to maintain the consistency of the … wording.” Id.
at 42.
As before, Williams’s challenge fails because he makes no attempt to
meet his burden of proving prejudice. See Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶22-25
(requiring proof of prejudice for counsel’s deficient performance in not
objecting to instruction improperly stating burden of proving imperfect selfdefense); Smith, 2012 UT App 338, ¶18.
In any event, he cannot do so. First, because self-defense was based on
the same facts for all of the charges, the jury’s rejection of it for one charge
would render harmless any omission of it in any other charge.
Second, Williams cannot establish that his counsel’s performance was
constitutionally ineffective because the jury instructions, taken as a whole,
adequately and appropriately addressed self-defense in relation to all of the
charged offenses. See State v. Ojeda, 2015 UT App 124, 350 P.3d 640 (jury
instructions are to be considered as a whole); Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶26-33 (no
deficiency so long as the instructions as a whole constitute “a correct
statement of the law”).
Williams was charged with aggravated assault and four counts of
domestic violence in the presence of a child. Aggravated assault was the
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predicate offense for all four of the other counts—it was the act of domestic
violence that was alleged to have been committed in the presence of the
children. Thus, the jury was instructed that it must find that Williams
committed aggravated assault in order to find him guilty of committing any
of the other four offenses. R358 (Jury Instr. 38a in Add. C). And as instructed,
the jury had to find that Williams did not act in self-defense when he
committed the aggravated assault. R339. So, when the jury used aggravated
assault as the predicate act of domestic violence for the greater offenses of
domestic violence in the presence of a child, it had already considered and
rejected Williams’s self-defense claim.
Similarly, Williams was charged with the lesser-included-offense of
assault together with four lesser-included-offenses of domestic violence in
the presence of a child. Assault was the predicate offense for all four of the
lesser domestic violence offenses. Thus, the jury was instructed that it could
only convict of the lesser-included offenses if it found he did not commit the
greater offenses. R354-357 (Jury Instr. 35-38). And the jury had to find that he
did not act in self-defense when he committed assault. R347. So, had the jury
used assault as the predicate act of domestic violence for the lesser domestic
violence offenses, it would have already considered and rejected Williams’s
self-defense claim.
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Thus, including lack of self-defense as an element in the greater and
lesser charges of domestic violence in the presence of a child would be
redundant: the jury only had to reject self-defense once. See, e.g., Ojeda, 2015
UT App 124, ¶6 (no ineffective assistance for not objecting to absence of a
redundant element from an instruction). Williams therefore establishes
neither deficient performance nor prejudice, and his claim fails. See Painter,
2014 UT App 272, ¶¶4-12 (absence of self-defense as element of aggravated
assault instruction neither deficient nor prejudicial where other instructions
properly stated the law); Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶22-25 (rejecting
ineffectiveness claim that murder instruction not containing “element” that
jury must find lack of self-defense led jury to convict without self-defense
determination).
III.
Williams has not proven that no competent attorney
could decide not to object to testimony from either the
investigating officer or Williams’s daughter.
Williams makes two final ineffective assistance claims. First, he argues
that his trial counsel should have made a hearsay objection to testimony from
an investigating officer that explained what he discovered at the crime scene
concerning Victim’s injuries. Aplt.Br. 42-43. But reasonable counsel could
conclude that a hearsay objection was inappropriate because the officer’s
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testimony was non-hearsay evidence admitted to explain the officer’s
conduct.
Second, Williams claims his trial counsel should have objected to or
moved to strike his daughter’s testimony that he “manipulated” her to get
her to write in her pre-trial statement that he acted in self-defense. Id. at 4345. He argues that the testimony was inadmissible character evidence and
that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel not to object. Id. at 45.
But reasonable counsel could conclude that it was more beneficial to the
defense to get D.D.’s written statement in and shift the “manipulation” label
to Ex-Wife than to object.
A. Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel could
have concluded that the officer’s testimony was offered for
purposes other than showing that the statements were true;
any potential impact was miniscule.
Williams has not proved that all reasonable counsel would have made
a hearsay objection to certain testimony from Officer Joshua Haskell. See
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124.
Williams objects to the following emphasized statements:
Q (by prosecutor). Well, at some point did – in speaking
with your other officers and your own inquiries with the people
involved, did you find a suspect of what caused – did you form
a belief on why [Victim] was injured?
A (Officer Haskell). I was told by almost everyone on scene that
the reason why the incident took place was [Victim] had discovered that
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the suspect in this case, Steven Williams, was cheating on her and she
found out. She said that she found out and confronted him about it and
I think even text the other girl and that’s what made him upset, and
that’s the reason why the incident took place.
Q. And based on your – the information you received from
those folks and your other assisting officers, how did she get
hurt?
A. I was told that he – I believe this is verbatim too, “cold-cock
punched her in the face.”
R834-35 (emphasis added) (in Add. D). Williams criticizes the emphasized
testimony as being inadmissible hearsay evidence that did not fit within an
exception to the rule against hearsay. Aplt.Br. 43.
But reasonable counsel could have come to the opposite conclusion
because, as shown by the remainder of the quoted exchange, the testimony
was offered to explain why Officer Haskell pursued his investigation.
Q. Okay. And so based on that, did you attempt to locate
Mr. Williams?
A. Yeah. Yeah. At that point, I tried to determine where he
would have gone, if he had any other known addresses, stuff like
that.
Q. Okay. And why did you feel that that was necessary?
A. Due to the extensive injuries, I knew that – it was more
– it was entering the realm of criminal rather than just, there’s a
little altercation between two people. You’ve seriously hurt this
person. I want to at least talk to you and get your side of the
story, and that’s what I attempted to do.
R835.
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Hearsay is an “out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted[.]” State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶44, 302 P.3d 844. But
an out-of-court statement that is “offered for some other purpose” and not
for its truth is not hearsay. See Arnold v. Grigsby, 2018 UT 14, ¶22, 417 P.3d 606
(statement not proscribed by hearsay rule when offered to show the effect on
the hearer, not for the truth of the matters asserted in the statement); State v.
Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987)(officer's testimony regarding
conversation with informant was not hearsay because it was admitted to
explain the officer's conduct); see also State v. Dodge, 2008 UT App 36U, *1
(statement offered to explain chronology of events and conduct of officers
was admissible as non-hearsay testimony); State in re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85
(Utah App. 1998) (out-of-court statements about which caseworker testified
were admissible because they were meant to explain her actions, not to prove
the truth of the matter asserted); Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah
App. 1987)(officer's testimony about his conversation with a store clerk was
admissible to explain the officer's conduct).
Whether the officer’s statements were truthful was irrelevant. What
was important was the part they played in the investigation. Reasonable
counsel could conclude that the statements were not offered as evidence of
what Williams actually did to Victim or what the children claimed he had
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done. As Haskell stated, the information came from his “assisting officers”
who gathered it while he was preoccupied with Victim, and it was part of
what led him to track down and arrest Williams. R833-36. As such, a
reasonable counsel could conclude that the statements were not
objectionable. See Dodge, 2008 UT App 36U, *2 (no ineffective assistance for
not making hearsay objection to statement of Dodge’s location where
statement was offered to explain police conduct and, therefore, was not
hearsay).
Williams’s prejudice argument is equally unpersuasive. He claims that
the officer’s testimony concerning “almost everyone on the scene” allowed
him to “restate and refine” the “disjointed” and “contradictory” trial
testimony of the four children. Aplt.Br. 43. But the officer’s testimony said
nothing about the children’s trial testimony. He summarized only what other
officers told him the children had told them at the scene. And again, the
testimony did not vouch for, restate, or refine the children’s testimony
because it only explained what prompted Williams’s arrest.
Moreover, any possible impact his brief testimony may have had on
the jury’s perception of the children’s testimony was miniscule given the
discrepancies already established between the written and in-court versions
of events recounted by the four young eyewitnesses. Far from “effectively
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remov[ing]” any doubt arising from the discrepancies (Aplt.Br. 43), the
officer’s brief overview of how and why Victim was injured contained too
little information factored through other officers to explain or otherwise
ameliorate the discrepancies in the children’s later reports and trial
testimony. And those discrepancies factored prominently in the parties’
closing remarks while the officer’s testimony did not. R981-85,1002,1009-10.
Where the jury heard the testimony of the four children, the discrepancies
identified by counsel, the explanations offered by the children, and the
characterization of those matters in closing arguments, then took at least one
written statement into deliberations, there is no reasonable likelihood that,
absent the officer’s statements, the jury would have reached a more favorable
decision for Williams.
B. Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel could have
concluded not to object to his daughter’s testimony.
Finally, Williams argues that his trial counsel should have objected
that D.D.’s characterization of Williams as “manipulative” was improper
character evidence. Aplt.Br. 43-45. But reasonable counsel could have chosen
not to object.
At trial, D.D. testified that before she saw Williams hit Victim in the
face, she saw Victim put her hands on Williams’s chest and push him but not
choke him. R680-81. Williams kept taunting her and trying to invade her
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space but did not seem to lose his breath. Id. When Victim later walked in
through the back door, D.D. said that Williams walked up to Victim and hit
her in the face. R676-77,710-11.
The prosecutor handed D.D. the statement she said she had written at
3 a.m. after being awake a “long time.” R688-89. The statement reflected in
capital letters that Williams “was using self-defen[s]e.” Def. Exh. 4. When
asked why she wrote that, she responded
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Because he [Williams] manipulated me into writing it.
How did he do that?
He had his own way of manipulating people.
Were you—did you feel like you had to write that?
Yes.
Why?
I do not know.

R689.
On cross-examination, defense counsel addressed the written
statement at length, using it to support the defense by highlighting parts of
the statement that suggested that Victim was the aggressor, establishing that
D.D. believed when she wrote it that Williams was acting in self-defense,
stressing that D.D. wrote it while living with Ex-Wife, and emphasizing that
D.D. and Ex-Wife have talked about the incident since D.D. wrote the
statement. R690,701-03,715-17. The prosecutor thereafter returned to the selfdefense discrepancy:
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Q. Now, you indicated that at the moment you wrote this
you thought your dad was using self-defense; is that accurate?
A.

Yes.

Q. Why did you think he was using self-defense when you
wrote this statement?
A. Because he manipulated me into saying it and I was also
raised by him saying that he always uses self-defense by—when
people, like, hit him or—I don’t know, like he was just trying—
like, he manipulated me into trying to say that he was defending
himself.
R719.
Williams proposes that the State used the manipulation terminology to
suggest that he acted in conformity with that trait by manipulating what his
daughter put in her written statement, implying that what she wrote was a
lie. Id. at 44. This prejudiced him, he claims, because it undermined the
defense before it could present its arguments to the jury. Id. at 45. He states
that there could be no “conceivable tactical basis” that would justify
admission of that characterization. Id.
But counsel’s conduct was in keeping with their trial strategy. Williams
must, but cannot, show that the strategy was unreasonable. The defense
theory was one of self-defense, and defense counsel emphasized the fact that
Williams claimed self-defense from the very start. See Aplt.Br. 45. R1002.
Counsel relied heavily on the children’s written statements in crossexamination, using them to establish that shortly after the altercation, all of
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the children corroborated Williams’s explanation that Victim hit, punched
and slapped him and that Williams had acted in self-defense. R999,1002-04
(defense closing argument). Counsel argued that the written statements
“corroborate a lot of what [Williams] said” and that he could not have
manipulated what they wrote because he was in jail at that time. R1003.
At the same time, defense counsel also challenged the credibility of the
children’s trial testimony by highlighting the differences between that
testimony and their earlier written statements, urging the jury to credit the
written statements, and blaming the differing trial testimony on Ex-Wife’s
influence. Aplt.Br. 45. R1003. Counsel explained that Williams’s kids had
lived with Ex-Wife since the night of the assault, that Ex-Wife “doesn’t even
like” Williams, and that she “wants to use this event to try to get custody of
the kids.” R1003.
This theory explains why defense counsel remained silent when D.D.
suggested she had been manipulated. They wanted to emphasize that the
children first reported that Williams was defending himself. They could not
get that part of the statement in and keep the State from letting D.D. explain
why she changed her testimony. And they had a way to shift the
“manipulation” label to Ex-Wife. The children had lived with her since the
night of the incident, and she wanted custody, which they presented as a
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motive for her to manipulate the children into changing their story for trial.
R610,642, 716,810,908-09. They also offered evidence to establish that Ex-Wife
had previously manipulated D.S. to lie about his father. R639-41,667-68; Def.
Exh. 3.
Further, when D.D. first used the word, it sounded oddly mature for
the witness, and she could not explain what she meant. R689. Defense counsel
thereafter used the last question asked of D.D. to play on the incongruity of
the word and to plant in the jury’s mind exactly what they wanted the jury
to believe: that while preparing D.D. for trial, Ex-Wife used that word to
describe Williams’s behavior. R720. Despite D.D.’s denial that Ex-Wife
suggested the word to her, the seed was planted, and the jury could consider
it along with earlier evidence counsel had adduced that Ex-Wife had, in the
past, “interfered with” and “used” D.S. to make false claims against Williams.
Def. Exh. 3.
Additionally, reasonable counsel could conclude that in order to get
the statement in, they could not object when D.D. tried to explain it. In fact,
the rules would have allowed the explanation. See Utah R. Evid. 613(b).
Reasonable counsel could also conclude that an objection might be seen by
the jury as further evidence of Williams’s attempt to manipulate her

-61-

testimony. See State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶38, 354 P.3d 791 (discussing
reasons for not objecting to an improper closing argument).
Reasonable counsel could conclude that on the whole, the defense was
better off getting the statement in and presenting evidence that it was more
likely that Ex-Wife manipulated D.D. than to risk having the statement
excluded to prevent D.D. from accusing Williams of manipulating her,
especially where D.D. could not detail how Williams actually manipulated
her or explain how he could have manipulated her after he was arrested. And
with the statement in, they could argue that, like the other children, D.D.’s
first report—that Williams was only defending himself—was more likely to
be true than her trial testimony. See id. at ¶¶37-40 (ineffective assistance claim
based on lack of objection fails given possible strategic reasons).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm all of Williams’s
convictions.
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